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Non-technical Summary
There already exists a rich empirical literature on labor supply. However, most of
the labor supply studies are based on several restrictive assumptions. One crucial
drawback of neoclassical labor supply models is the assumption that people can
freely choose the quantity of working hours, that is, observed hours are supposed to
equal desired hours. This only holds if there are no hours constraints within jobs
and no mobility costs between jobs. Other drawbacks are the assumptions that time
use is an individual decision, whereby spouses are assumed to maximize two
individual utility functions and that the wage rate, which is one of the most
important determinants of labor supply, does not depend on the quantity of hours
worked. Because empirical studies show that these suppositions are not appropriate,
we adapt the neoclassical labor supply model in the required way.
In the literature, we can already find several attempts to incorporate restrictions in
the labor market. These studies differ in the way the household context is modeled,
if at all. As we assume that the labor supply decisions of spouses are mutually
dependent, we choose a family labor supply model which allows for hours
restrictions, defined as deviations between actual and desired hours. We further take
into account that the wage rate can differ between full-time and part-time jobs.
We conclude that the model with endogenous wages and hours restrictions fits the
data much better than the standard neoclassical labor supply model. As expected,
the estimation results imply that part-time jobs of women increase family utility
provided that they are desired. On the other hand, if the part-time job does not
correspond to the desired working hours of the spouses, the household suffers a
decrease in utility, independent of whether the man or the woman faces the hours
restriction. These results show that not all households in which the woman works
part-time are worse off in terms of utility.
We can further show that the hours restrictions reduce the adjustment of hours due
to wage fluctuations. Thus, we conclude that the consideration of hours restrictions
not only improves the explanation of labor supply decisions but also has an impact
on the derived wage elasticities, in short, hours restrictions do matter.
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Abstract
The labor supply of West German married and cohabiting couples is analyzed using
a discrete choice model. Following van Soest (1995), the labor supply decision is
based on a household utility function which is determined by the leisure of the two
spouses and net household income. Furthermore, heterogeneity of preferences and
the German tax and benefit system are taken into account. We extend the
neoclassical labor supply model in two directions. First, we allow for endogenous
wages and find that there exist substantial wage differences between part-time and
full-time jobs. In view of the negative wage differentials of part-time jobs, the
model with endogenous wages predicts lower part-time employment than the
standard neoclassical model. Compared with the distribution of actual hours
worked, the share of part-time jobs is highly underpredicted. In a second step, hours
restrictions are accommodated, as a result of which the estimated wage elasticities
of both spouses are substantially reduced.
JEL classification: J22, C25
Acknowledgements
This work is part of the research project "Arbeitszeitflexibilisierung und Beschäftigung" at the
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW). I thank Viktor Steiner and François Laisney for
fruitful discussions, and Wolfgang Franz, Arthur van Soest, Rob Euwals, Reinhold Schnabel and
John Addison for their helpful comments.
11  Introduction
There already exists a rich empirical literature on the labor supply. Most studies
focus on the behavior of women. In contrast, less research is available on the time
use of men, presuming that their supply decisions are hardly influenced by wages,
the tax system or household demographics (e.g. Pencavel, 1986). In any event, most
of the labor supply studies are based on several restrictive assumptions.
One crucial assumption of standard neoclassical labor supply models is that people
can freely choose the amount of working hours, that is, observed hours correspond
to desired hours. This assumption only holds if there are no hours constraints within
jobs and no mobility costs between jobs. Actually, there is some evidence that this
assumption does not hold. For one thing, this kind of labor supply model cannot
explain the peak in observed working hours at about 40 hours a week and the
smaller peak around 20 hours. For another, the results of several surveys indicate
that people do not always work their desired hours, that is, they are constrained with
respect to working hours. There have been different attempts to take such labor
market constraints into account. Dickens and Lundberg (1993), for example, try to
disentangle preferences and labor market restrictions using the distribution of
observed working time. They find that people searching for a part-time job face
severe hours restrictions. The problem with this approach is that the identification
of the supply and demand side is based solely on information on the distribution of
actual working hours, the outcome of desired and offered hours. Ilmakunnas and
Pudney (1990), as well as Euwals and van Soest (1996), avoid this drawback by
using information on both actual and desired working hours.
Secondly, the labor supply decision is typically treated as an individual decision,
whereby spouses are assumed to maximize two individual utility functions. But
there are strong arguments supporting the idea that the decisions of married or
cohabiting couples depend on each other. In principle, there exist two competing
theoretical approaches to model the intrafamily time use. One approach is to assume
that spouses decide jointly about their labor supply and other household decisions,
that is, they maximize a joint family utility function. Based on this supposition,
Hausman and Ruud (1984) extended the individual labor supply model to a family
labor supply model. Also Aaberge et al. (1997) and van Soest (1995) apply this
research strategy and allow for hours restrictions as well. The alternative is a non-
cooperative bargaining model (see for example, Ott, 1992). In this case, the spouses
maximize individual utility functions which are mutually dependent, so that the
outcome depends on the labor supply decision of the partner and on the individual
bargaining power. Clear empirical evidence on which approach is superior is still
lacking.
2Thirdly, the wage rate, which is one of the most important determinants of labor
supply, is often assumed to be independent of the hours worked. But there are
several empirical studies indicating that wages do depend on the amount of hours
worked. Tummers and Woittiez (1991) conclude that full-time employees in the
Netherlands receive lower gross wage rates than do those working part-time,
whereas the opposite holds for Great Britain, the USA and Finland (Main, 1988;
Ermisch/Wright, 1993; Avarett/Hotchkiss, 1997; Ilmakunnas/Pudney, 1990). The
previous results for Germany are in line with those in the latter countries
(Schwarze, 1998).
In recognition of these deficiencies, we analyze a structural model of labor supply
of West German couples with hours constraints and endogenous wages. Further-
more, we consider the labor supply as a joint decision of both spouses. More spe-
cifically, we extend the family labor supply model of van Soest (1995) by allowing
the wage rate to depend on hours.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe our family labor
supply model and its extensions concerning the endogeneity of wages and the hours
restrictions. The data and some descriptive numbers on labor supply are presented
in Section 3. Section 4 presents the estimation results and the simulated wage
elasticities. Section 5 concludes.
2 The econometric model
Unlike the classical labor supply model, in which the choice set of the decision-
maker is continuous, we use a discrete choice model with a finite number of
alternatives (see e.g. van Soest, 1995)1. Further, we assume that the corresponding
household budget is determined by the working hours and the hourly wage rate,
which, among other factors, also depends on hours worked. We also consider the
impact of the German tax and benefit system. Finally we further extend the model
and allow for hours restrictions.
2.1 The discrete labor supply model
In the discrete choice approach, we assume that each family can choose among a
finite number of combinations of male and female working hours { }( , )l lm f . If the
working hours of each family member is grouped in, say, five categories (including
a category for zero hours), the family can choose among 25 labor supply
alternatives – each corresponding to a certain family after-tax income. The family's
after-tax income includes the men's and women's labor earnings, income from other
                                          
1
 In the following we use "couple" and "family" as synonyms for married and cohabiting persons.
3sources, potential unemployment benefits and other transfers less the taxes. How
benefits and taxes depend on the family income and other characteristics of the
household and the individuals is described in Section 2.2.2. One important
advantage of the discrete labor supply model is that non-linear tax schedules and tax
breaks due to joint filing and other regulations of the German tax and benefit system
can be incorporated into the model relatively easily.
Following van Soest (1995), we assume that the direct utility function can be
approximated by a translog specification
(1) U(v)  = v Av +  b v′ ′  ,
where v (log , log , log )= ′y l lm f  is a vector (in logs) of the components of the utility
function. A is a symmetric 3x3 matrix with the elements α ij i j( , , , )=1 2 3  and ′b  is a
3x1 vector ( ( , , ) )b = ′β β β1 2 3 . The variables α ij  and β j  are parameters of the utility
function which have to be estimated. While the parameters β j  measure the direct
effect of the goods (log , log ,log )y l l
m f  on the family utility, the matrix A also
captures the effect of the interactions between the three components of the utility
function.
Individual preferences for leisure depend on the actual household situation (i.e. the
labor supply of both household members and the family income), as well as on
individual characteristics of the household such as the presence of young children.
Thus, the impact of leisure on household utility is not the same for all men and
women. The interaction between individual time preference and the actual labor
supply of the household is already captured by the first part of the utility function
(v Av)′ . The impact of individual characteristics on the preference for leisure enter
the utility function through the term ′b v. Thus, the heterogeneity of preferences for
leisure is incorporated through the parameters β 2  and β 3. We assume that the
valuation of the man’s leisure depends mainly on his age ( )agem . The contribution
of the woman’s leisure to the household utility depends further on the number of
young children in the household (the variable k3 counts all children up to the age of
3 years, k16 measures the number of children between age 4 and 16).
Thus, we have,
(2)   β β β β2 20 21 22 2= + ⋅ + ⋅age agem m
and
(3) β β β β β β3 30 31 32 2 33 34= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅age age k3 k16f f .
4Because labor income is determined by work preferences, which vary across
households, we suppose that the impact of income on family utility itself (β1) does
not depend on household demographics.
Starting from this specification of the family utility function, we are interested in
the decision process of the couples. We assume that each family chooses the regime
which offers the highest utility. Thus, the observed labor supply decision is
regarded as the utility maximizing choice between the 25 possible alternatives of
the choice set; that is, U* = Ua > Ur , for all r ≠ a, where a defines the actual choice
and r all other regimes. This discrete decision problem can be described by a
conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974), which can be derived from a random
utility maximization approach. The multinomial logit and the conditional logit
model differ in that the choice probability of the former approach depends on choice
characteristics as well as on individual attributes. In the conditional logit model the
probability that regime a is chosen is defined as
(4)
P U U r a P v Av b v v Av b v r a
U y l l U y l l
a r a a r r
a
m
a
f
a r
m
r
f
r
r
> ∀ ≠ = ′ + ′ − ′ − ′ > ∀ ≠
=
=
∑
, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
exp( (log , log , log )) / exp( (log , log , log )) .
0
1
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By solving equation (4) it becomes obvious that all variables, which are the same
for all alternatives (e.g. the household characteristics), drop out. Therefore, all
household specific variables have to be interacted with the alternative-specific
variables, otherwise no individual effects could be estimated. Inserting (2) into
equation (4), the parameters α ij  and β j  can be estimated using maximum likelihood.
Given that every regime is defined by the male and female labor supply and the
household net income, we now have to compute the corresponding net household
income for each of the 25 regimes.
2.2 The Budget Constraint
The net household income of the majority of families is mainly determined by the
individual wage rates of the family members and the German tax and benefit sys-
tem. In the following we will briefly describe how wages, taxes and transfers enter
the budget constraint.
2.2.1 Endogenous wages
The most important part of the household budget is labor income, which depends on
the individual wage rates and the paid working hours of both spouses. Human
capital theory implies that the individual hourly wage rate is mainly determined by
5the education level and labor market experience. But there are strong arguments that
the number of hours worked also have a significant impact on the wage rate.
In the literature, we can find four (not mutually exclusive) explanations for wages
dependent on hours. One idea is that the labor costs of the firm do not increase pro-
portionally with hours worked. The hourly wage rate attached to part-time jobs may
be lower compared to an equivalent full-time job, because part-time jobs cause
relatively higher fixed costs to the firm (e.g. recruiting and training costs, arranging
a work-place and coordination costs). On the other hand the working hours may
also influence productivity. Reduced working hours may raise hourly productivity
because they avoid the negative fatigue effect of a long working day or they lessen
unproductive time, or "slack". A report by McKinsey (1994) comes to the conclu-
sion that the higher labor costs for part-time employees are over-compensated
mainly by higher productivity, improved capital utilization and the reduction of
absenteeism. Therefore, gross part-time wages – given they are based on labor pro-
ductivity – should be higher. Thus, we cannot exclude in advance that part-time
wages exceed the hourly wage rate of full-time jobs. Tummers and Woittiez (1991),
for example, show that part-time employees in the Netherlands earn higher hourly
wages than people working full-time. The third explanation is based on the idea of
compensating wage differentials. Ermisch and Wright (1993) argue that a large pro-
portion of women who work part-time do so because they have home responsibili-
ties, like children. Employers who offer part-time jobs can substitute the attribute of
reduced hours, which correspond to the time preferences of many mothers, for a
wage reduction because these women may accept a certain negative wage differen-
tial. Thus, the labor supply elasticity with respect to wages should be lower for part-
time jobs. Finally it could be argued that a lack of part-time jobs in general
decreases the wage rate for these scarce jobs. Empirical studies for several countries
confirm these hypotheses (e.g. Ermisch/Wright, 1993; Avarett/Hotchkiss, 1997). In
Germany, the lump sum taxation of jobs without social security coverage provides
another reason for a negative wage differential for these jobs. Schwarze (1998)
argues that employers shift the entire tax burden (15 percent of the gross wage rate)
on to employees. In this case, the hourly wage rates of these jobs are about 15 per-
cent below those for comparable full-time jobs.
Thus, there are reasons for supposing that there are substantial wage differences
between full-time and part-time jobs also in Germany, and especially between
insured and uninsured jobs. Firstly, subsidized community child care facilities are
very limited and private child care is expensive in Germany, which is one of the
main problems for mothers who are searching for a job (Engelbrech et al., 1997).
Part-time jobs are often the only feasible employment for mothers. Merz (1990)
shows that therefore children and other factors reflecting family circumstances have
a stronger impact on the labor supply of married women than does the economic
situation of the family. Secondly, part-time jobs are scarce, especially for qualified
6employees. Thus, we take into account the endogeneity of the wage rate when
calculating the household income of the different labor supply regimes. Estimation
results are presented in section 4.1.
2.2.2 The German Tax and Benefit System
Apart from labor income, household net income is also determined by the German
tax and benefit system. A brief overview of the existing system in the year 1995, to
which the empirical analysis refers, is next given.
In Germany couples have the choice between joint and separate filing of their
incomes. Provided that spouses income differs, there are strong incentives for joint
filing which is known as Ehegattensplitting. In this case, the incomes of the two
spouses are added and divided by two. The appropriate tax rate is calculated on the
basis of the resulting per capita income. The German tax system is further charac-
terized by several deductions and allowances which reduce the tax base. First of all,
a basic allowance is applied to guarantee the subsistence level. Further deductions
exist for special expenses (e.g. own training and education), extraordinary expenses
(e.g. educational expenses for children older than 18 years or people with disabili-
ties) and losses. There also exist a variety of deductions mainly available to the high
income earners, the self employed and those with non-labor earnings. In addition,
tax allowances are given for each dependent child in the household. Finally, for sin-
gle parents an additional household allowance can be deducted.
In a next step, the resulting net income is reduced by the social insurance premiums,
which are mandatory for employees. The contribution for the three basic insurances
(health and long-term care insurance, unemployment insurance and the old-age
pension) is a fixed percentage of gross earnings for a certain income interval.
Employees whose gross labor income is below the lower limit pay no social insur-
ance premiums. There is also an upper limit on gross earnings, beyond which no
contribution has to be paid any longer. In 1995, the upper limit was 7,800 DM gross
earnings per month for the unemployment and the old-age insurance and 5,850 DM
for the health insurance. The lower limit was 580 DM for all social insurances.
The German social benefit system is rather complicated. The most important ele-
ments are child benefits, social assistance and housing benefits. The child benefit is
paid to all families with children younger than 16 years (or younger than 27 years,
provided that they are still at school or university or in vocational training). Thus,
the amount of the benefit depends on the number and the age of the children in the
household. Apart from the benefits for the first child, the transfer for all other chil-
dren are means-tested, the amount depending on annual household net income in the
penultimate year. If the couple (the single parent) earned more than 26.600 DM
gross (19.000 DM) in that year, the current transfer is reduced stepwise according to
7the excess of annual net income above this limit. In contrast to child benefits, social
assistance may be claimed by all individuals whose income is below a certain limit
and no other support is available. There exist two different types of social assis-
tance: firstly, welfare assistance (Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt) for people who are
unable to work and, secondly, assistance for special circumstances (Hilfe in beson-
deren Lebenslagen), namely, for the sick or disabled persons and those in need of
care. The level of social assistance transfer depends on the number and the age of
the household members, their earned and unearned incomes (e.g. child benefits) and
their needs. Furthermore, low income families may be entitled to housing
allowances (Wohngeld).
In order to determine the exact budget set for the different labor supply regimes,
various calculations are necessary. The first step is the simulation of the German tax
and benefit system. Given its complexity, however, only the main features of the
German tax and benefit system where considered.
In particular, the child benefits and the social assistance benefits are derived in a
relative detailed way according to the legal regulations. In calculating the child
benefit, we take into account the age of the children. The claim on social assistance
is derived from the household net income (including child benefits). Potential
transfers from other sources (e.g. divorced men or children) are ignored.
We estimate the net household income taking into account the main features of the
existing tax system:  the Ehegattensplitting, the basis tax allowance and some other
deductions and the social security premiums. We assume that all married couples
choose to split their income. Therefore, we estimate different tax functions for
married and cohabiting couples. The estimation results are presented in Table A1 in
the Appendix.
2.3 Hours restrictions
If individuals are restricted in choosing their working hours, the preceding model
must be modified, because it only holds for the unconstrained choice. Several
empirical labor supply studies show that models which do not allow for hours
restrictions strongly overpredict the number of part-time jobs (e.g. Gerfin, 1991;
van Soest et al., 1990; Dickens/Lundberg, 1993; and van Soest, 1995). This leads
one to believe that hours restrictions may have a significant impact on labor supply.
Since this study is an extension of the labor supply model developed by van Soest
(1995), we will briefly summarize the estimation results and the conclusions he
derived. Van Soest (1995) estimated the basic discrete choice model (see section
2.1) for the Netherlands in the year 1987, taking into account the Dutch tax and
benefit system. He argued that the overprediction of part-time jobs may be due to a
8lack of jobs offering reduced hours. The shortage of part-time jobs can be
explained, for example, by fixed costs of hiring workers. Given a lack of part-time
jobs, searching for such a rare job causes higher costs for the employees. This
implies that people working part-time are worse off. Van Soest (1995) tries to
correct for this by including alternative-specific constant terms in the utility
function, indicating whether or not the man or the woman works part-time. The
coefficients of these constant terms were all significantly negative, which confirms
the hypothesis that hours restrictions matter.
The drawback of this approach is that the author implicitly assumes hours restric-
tions to be the same for all individuals in labor force. On the one hand, it is quite
conceivable that a part-time job generates utility to the family because it allows a
mother to participate in the labor market and earn extra money. On the other hand,
there may be, apart from the possible negative wage differential, other disadvan-
tages of part-time jobs, such as worse prospects of promotion or less social accep-
tance. Accordingly, the matter of hours constraints should vary across households.
In the presence of hours restrictions, observed working hours may not correspond to
the utility maximizing choice in a world without restrictions. Thus, observed work-
ing hours cannot strictly be interpreted as revealed preferences. In the basic model
(see equations (1) - (3)), the utility of leisure (or part-time work) depends on
individual characteristics, such as age, the number of children, and other family
characteristics. But people may accept a part-time job even if it is not utility
maximizing. This could be the case if a full-time job is not available and the utility
of working part-time exceeds the utility of the non-working situation:
U U c l l U U c l l U U c l lm f
p p
m
p
f m f
m m m m m m∗
= > = > =( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )* * * * *0 0 0 , where U* is the maxi-
mum feasible utility of the family, U pm  is the utility if the man works part-time and
only the woman works the desired hours, and U m0  is the household utility if the
man’s labor supply is zero. This second-best choice can also be interpreted as a
utility maximizing choice which is derived from a reduced choice set.
In short, part-time work may be detrimental to individuals who prefer working full-
time but cannot find an adequate job. For other individuals, part-time work may be
the optimal choice, because they want to spend more time for other activities (e.g.
child care). Actual labor supply depends not only on the preferences but also on
whether or not these preferences can be realized. In contrast with the basic model,
we now allow for the case that the observed choice is not necessarily the utility
maximizing choice. In order to identify those employees who do not work their
desired hours, we use information about desired working hours contained in our
data. It is assumed that only those part-time employees who are not satisfied with
their working time suffer a utility reduction.
93 Data and Descriptive Analysis
Estimation of the model is based on data from the German Socio Economic Panel
(GSOEP) for the year 1995. The GSOEP is a representative household survey for
the German population conducted every year since 1984 in West Germany and,
since 1990, also in East Germany. We restrict our analysis to West Germany,
because the standard working hours differ between East and West Germany and
because there are large differences in the labor supply behavior, especially between
East and West German women. In the first wave, about 12,000 individuals in 6,000
households in West Germany were interviewed. The panel attrition during the
following years is partly compensated for by including new households, if an indi-
vidual of an initial panel household set up a new or moved to another household. In
the West German survey of 1995 more than 10,000 individuals in about 5,000
households were interviewed.
For our empirical analysis, we defined the following subsample: at the outset we
selected all couples who live in the same household. We then dropped couples if
both spouses were older than 64 years, because their family labor supply is
supposed to be zero. Further, we excluded foreigners for two reasons. Firstly, labor
supply decisions, especially for women, are strongly determined by values and sex-
role preferences which differ substantial between nationalities (Hakim, 1997).
Therefore, including a foreigner dummy and interaction terms seem not sufficient to
control for these differences. Secondly, guest workers, who represent a considerable
part of all foreigners in Germany, are oversampled in the GSOEP. This can also
cause problems for the analysis of the labor supply of couples (Laisney et al., 1993).
We also excluded couples working in the farming and forestry sector, because they
are often unpaid family workers. After these exclusions there remain about 2,380
couples in the sample, of which 300 are unmarried. Due to missing data we lost
another 4 percent of these observations.
We now consider the distribution of actual and desired hours of this subsample.
Figure 1 provides histograms of actual hours, separately for men and women. In
contrast with the 5 categories in the family labor supply model described above, we
now generate 8 groups, because there are more observations if we look at the indi-
vidual labor supply. The first category (zero hours) includes all persons out of work,
whereas the open category at the upper end of the distribution contains all persons
who answered that they work more than 70 hours a week. Several men and also
some women claimed that they worked more than 84 hours a week during the
preceding month. Assuming that the productivity of the working hours exceeding
84 hours (12 hours a day) is zero or at least very low, we censored the number of
actual working hours at this threshold.
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Figure 1: The distribution of actual weekly working hours in West Germany
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Source: Author’s own calculations based on the German Socio Economic Panel, 1995.
The distribution of actual hours for men has a peak at 31-40 hours a week, which
mainly represents standard full-time jobs (see Figure 1).2 But also some 25 percent
of men work between 41 and 50 hours, and 7.5 percent work between 51 and 60
hours. Only 3 percent work more than 61 hours a week. In view of the fact that
agreed working hours never exceed 40 hours a week by law, at least 35 percent of
the male sample evidently work overtime.
Women’s working hours differ strongly from men’s. Compared to men, there are
many women working less than 31 hours a week. Almost 10 percent of all women
in the sample work less than 16 hours, and are mostly not covered by social security
(geringfügige Beschäftigung). Furthermore, about 18 percent of women work part-
time. In this study, part-time employment is defined as 16-30 hours a week. Apart
from the actual working hours, there are also strong differences between male and
female participation rates. The share of women with zero hours of work is almost 45
percent in 1995, whereas the share of inactive men is about 17 percent. 3
In addition to actual labor supply, the employees in the GSOEP are also asked how
many hours they would like to work, taking into account the resulting income
                                          
2
 Standard working hours are fixed by collective agreement and vary by sector between 35 and 40
hours per week (Bispinck, 1996). Exceptions are some big companies, such as Volkswagen AG,
where the standard working week was 28 hours.
3
 The relatively low participation rates in our sample are partly due to the selection process.
Because we did not exclude individuals older than 60 years, the data also contain the early
retirees.
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variation.4 The distribution of desired working hours differs strongly from the dis-
tribution of actual hours in many respects (see Figure 2). Firstly, both for males and
females, the desired participation rate is higher, that is, men as well as women are
involuntarily unemployed to some extent. It is striking that most men want to work
full-time (31-40 hours), whereas the majority of women who want to work prefers a
part-time job (16-30 hours). The proportion of women working full-time is nearly
identical to those who actually prefer a full-time job. However, we cannot conclude
that all women who have a full-time job are satisfied with their working hours,
because it need not be the same women who would like to work full-time.
Figure 2: The distribution of desired weekly working hours in West Germany
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Source: Author’s own calculations based on the German Socio Economic Panel, 1995.
In the presence of imperfect mobility or incomplete information, there may be a
mismatch between actual and desired hours at the individual level even if the actual
number of full-time jobs equals the number of desired full-time jobs in the aggre-
gate. Table 1 shows the deviation of desired hours from actual hours. The shares
represent the percentages of men (women) for each group of actual working hours
who state that they desire to work a certain number of weekly working hours. For
instance, 58.1 percent of the non-working women state that they do not want to
work, and 28 percent of these women prefer to work part-time. The last column
shows the number of observations for each category of actual hours. The framed
cells indicate for each category of actual hours worked the category of desired hours
preferred by the highest share of people in the respective category. For women,
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 The exact wording of the question is: "If you could choose your working time, taking into
account that your income changes accordingly, how many hours would you like to work per
week".
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these cells are located mainly on the diagonal, that is, the majority of women are
satisfied with their actual working hours. Nevertheless, the actual hours do not
correspond to the desired hours in many cases. For example, only 62.4 percent of
the full-time employed women are satisfied with their working hours. Almost 30
percent prefer a part-time job and another 5 percent would like to work up to 15
hours. This does not hold for men. With the exception of non-working men and
those working between 16 and 30 hours, most of the men prefer a standard full-time
job without overtime. Thus, almost all framed cells are in the row of desired hours
between 31 and 40 hours.
Table 1: Actual versus desired weekly working hours (in percent)
actual hours desired hours
men 0 h 1-15 h 16-30 h 31-40 h 41-50 h 51-60 h 61-70 h >70 h # obs.
0 h 69.2 0 1.5 29.2 0 0 0 0 390
1-15 h 0 30.8 10.3 48.7 10.3 0 0 0 39
16-30 h 0 7.9 57.9 28.9 5.3 0 0 0 38
31-40 h 0 2.9 8.1 80.9 7.3 0 0 0.4 1014
41-50 h 0 3.7 4.6 70.2 19.5 2.0 0 0 563
51-60 h 0 6.5 2.4 45.3 31.2 13.5 0 1.2 170
61-70 h 0 4.8 0 47.6 26.2 11.9 4.8 4.8 42
>70 h 0 3.8 0 30.8 30.8 23.1 3.8 7.7 26
women
0 h 58.1 0 28.0 13.9 0 0 0 0 1006
1-15 h 0 55.2 36.2 7.6 0.5 0.5 0 0 210
16-30 h 0 10.4 81.9 7.7 0 0 0 0 415
31-40 h 0 4.8 29. 62.4 3.0 0.2 0 0.4 537
41-50 h 0 6.4 24.5 58.2 9.1 0.9 0 0.9 110
51-60 h 0 10.5 10.5 57.9 21.1 0 0 0 19
61-70 h 0 0 16.7 16.7 16.7 50.0 0 0 6
>70 h 0 0 25.0 50.0 25.0 0 0 0 4
Source: Author’s own calculations based on the German Socio Economic Panel, 1995.
As we are interested in the joint labor supply of couples, we now merge the
information on both spouses’ actual labor supply within one household. We con-
struct 25 possible labor supply regimes of the household, with five categories for
men and women, respectively. Because of the difference between the hours distri-
bution of men and women, the width of the intervals is not the same. For women,
we can create two categories for part-time jobs: one for employment up to 15 hours
a week (geringfügige Beschäftigung), which has become more and more popular in
recent years, and a second group for standard part-time jobs. Full-time jobs are
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defined as jobs between 31 and 40 hours a week and all other jobs are put together
into one "overtime category". Because of the small number of observations, there
exist only one category for part-time jobs for men. On the other hand, we divide the
"overtime category" of men into two groups, comprising those working up to 50
hours and the rest.
Table 2: Actual distribution of the 25 labor supply regimes
female labor supply (in weekly hours)
male 0 h 1-15 h 16-30 h 31-40 h 41-84 h ∑
0 h 227 16 49 81 14 387
10.0 0.7 2.1 3.61 0.6 17.0
1-30 h 25 10 16 20 5 76
1.1 0.4 0.7 0.9 0.2 3.3
31-40 h 405 108 194 269 40 1016
17.8 4.7 8.5 11.8 1.8 44.6
41-50 h 239 56 103 114 51 563
10.5 2.5 4.5 5.0 2.2 24.7
51-84 h 94 21 51 44 28 238
4.1 0.9 2.2 1.9 1.2 10.4
∑ 990 211 413 528 138 2280
43.4 9.3 18.1 23.2 6.1 100.0
∑(part-time) 624
27.4
Source: Author’s own calculations based on the German Socio Economic Panel, 1995.
The larger printed numbers in Table 2 show the number of observations within each
of the 25 labor supply regimes of married and cohabiting couples. The most
frequent occurrences are written in italics. The small numbers beneath present the
shares of each regime with respect to all couples. We can see that in almost 10
percent of the selected households neither member receives labor income. The most
frequent choice of household labor supply is one in which the man works between
31 and 40 hours and the woman is out of work (17.8 percent of the couples). In
another 12 percent of households both men and women work full-time. The third
most populous regime (about 10 percent of the couples) is where the man works
between 41 and 50 hours a week and the wife has no paid work. These four regimes
are printed in italic letters and we pay special attention to them in the following
analysis.
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4 Empirical results
4.1 Wage equations
Before estimating the family utility function, we present the fitted wage equations.
Predicted wages are assigned to those individuals who do not participate in the
labor market (about 17 percent of all men and 44 percent of all women in the
sample), and for whom no wage rate can therefore be observed. Because wage
determination can differ structurally by gender, we run separate regressions for
males and females.5 The wage equation is modeled on the basis of an extended
human capital approach:
(5) w f plme educ r children handic s m fs s s s f s= =( , , , , ); ,
where plmes  measures potential labor market experience6, educs  indicates the
education level and rs  captures regional differences in unemployment rates and
other labor market conditions. According to human capital theory, each break in
employment devaluates human capital, returns to qualifications decrease. For
women, we try to correct for this impact by including the number of children
( )childrenf  into the wage equation. Finally, we allow for the lower wages of
handicapped people ( )handics . The dependent variable ws is defined as the log of
the hourly gross wage rate.
The estimation results are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. The signs and
magnitudes of most of the estimated coefficients are in line with the expected
effects. Thus, the wage increases with education level and potential labor market
experience. However striking is the result that handicapped women have
significantly higher wages than healthy women. This is likely due to the fact that we
do not correct for wage differences between industries and firm sizes, which are
also important determinants of the wage rate.7
                                          
5
 The selection bias of the observed wage is not taken into account here. Steiner/Wagner (1997)
test for selectivity bias in their earnings functions estimated on the GSOEP data for 1990 and
1995 by including a selectivity-correction term (Heckman, 1979). They show that the estimated
parameters in the selectivity-corrected earnings equation change very little even when the
selectivity term is significant.
6
 Potential labor market experience is defined as: age - years of education - 6.
7
 Handicapped women are, for instance, underrepresented in the trading and the private service
sector, which are known as low-wage sectors. In addition, they are overrepresented in large
firms, which pay higher wages in general. If we correct for firm size and sector differentials, the
positive wage differential of handicapped women becomes insignificant. Even so, we do not
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Up to this point, it has been assumed that the wage rate does not depend on the
amount of hours worked. We now follow Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990) and
incorporate the endogeneity of the wage rate by further extending the standard
human capital wage equation. As we suppose that the hourly wage rate also depends
on the working hours (hs), we estimate wage differentials between the different
labor supply regimes separately for men and women using the following
specification:
(6) w f h plme educ r children handic s m fs s s s s f s= =( , , , , , ); ,
In this paper we estimate equation (6) by OLS and ignore the potential simultaneity
of working hours and wages. Since Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990) conclude that an
instrumental variable estimation generates comparable results, this seems to be an
adequate first approach.
Based on the estimation results, we predict the wage rate of the spouses’ observed
labor supply w l and w lma fa( ) ( ) . The wage rates w lmr( ) and w lfr( ) of the three alter-
native labor supply situations of men and women are computed based on the
estimated wage differentials. Accordingly, we predict wages for those individuals
who currently do not participate in the labor market.
Factors other than human capital, hours worked and regional differences in labor
market conditions, such as industrial sector and firm size, are also known to be
important determinants of individual wages. Empirical studies also show that these
wage differentials hardly change over time (for Germany see for example
Steiner/Wagner, 1997). However, since we do not know which sector or firm size
job movers (or those who return to the labor market) would choose, these factors
cannot be taken into account in the estimated wage equation.
The estimation results presented in Table A2 in the appendix suggest that the hourly
wage rate depends on labor supply even if we control for qualification and the other
explanatory variables in the wage equation. Women working overtime receive a
hourly wage rate which is on average 22.1 percent8 below the wage rate of standard
full-time jobs. Also, women with a part-time job accept wage reductions compared
to full-time jobs and the disadvantages of jobs with less than 16 hours is even
                                                                                                                                         
include these variables into the wage equations, because we do not know which sector or firm
size the currently non-working people would choose.
8
 The percentages of the wage differentials are derived from the estimated parameters in the wage
equation (see Table A2 in the Appendix). For example, the wage differential for women
working overtime is (exp(0.20) -1) 100 = 22.1×  percent.
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higher (36.2 percent). These findings correspond to the results of Ermisch and
Wright (1993) for Great Britain and Schwarze (1998) for Germany, even if our
estimated wage differentials are a bit larger. So, these results should be taken with
caution for the reasons mentioned earlier.9 The findings are somewhat different for
men. Only employees working more than 50 hours a week earn significantly less
money per hour. Compared with other employees they accept, or have to accept, a
negative wage differential of 18.5 percent. The other coefficients of the wage
equation hardly change as compared with the first specification of the wage
equation.10
4.2 Labor supply models
We now turn to the estimation of the utility function described in Section 2. We
begin with the basic model, defined by the equations (1) through (3). Two important
drawbacks of this specification are the assumptions that the individual wage rate is
independent of the hours worked (see Section 2.2) and that all individuals can freely
choose their working hours (see Section 2.3). Thus, we sequentially drop these
restrictive assumptions and compare the estimation results from the extended
specification with those from the basic model.
4.2.1 The standard neoclassical labor supply model
In this paper, we describe the family labor supply decision as a choice among 25
labor supply regimes which are defined by combinations of male and female
working hours and the corresponding household income. The results of the
maximum likelihood estimation of the basic model are presented in Table A3
(Model 1) in the Appendix. Given the characteristics of the individuals in the
sample, the resulting coefficients describe a utility function which best explains the
labor supply decisions of the families. The estimated parameters can be interpreted
as implicit prices of the elements in the utility function, that is, positive coefficients
indicate that the corresponding variable, such as income, increases the utility. At
first glance, it is not clear whether the household utility increases with net income,
because the linear term of the family’s net income is both highly negative and
strongly significant. Therefore, we calculated the derivative ∂ ∂U y, which is
positive for all households. We can conclude that the utility function is quasicon-
cave in the relevant area, that is, household utility increases with net income. The
                                          
9
 If we control for example for firm size and industrial sectors, the female wage differential
between full-time jobs and part-time jobs with less than 16 hours falls to 25.9 percent and the
coefficient of part-time jobs becomes insignificant
10
 Just as for women, the negative wage differential decreases (to -13.7 percent) if we include firm
size and industrial sectors into the set of explanatory variables in the wage equation.
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other parameters of the utility function have the expected signs. The parameters of
the interactions between age and leisure (l age l age l age l agem m f f× × × ×, , ,2 2) imply
that the labor supply of men reaches a maximum when they are about 36 years old.
Women reach their maximum 6 years earlier. The labor supply of women is further
determined by the number of children in the household. Children younger than four
years of age decrease female’s labor supply significantly. Even if the impact of older
children (between four and sixteen years) is much smaller, the coefficient is still
significantly negative. The coefficient of the interaction between the man’s and the
woman’s leisure (l lm f× ) can be interpreted as follows: given the labor supply of
women, the valuation of their leisure increases with the leisure of their partners, so
that male and female leisure are complementary. This seems to be a plausible result.
Table 3: Relative deviations from the actual distribution based on the neoclassical model
female labor supply (in weekly hours)
male 0 h 1-15 h 16-30 h 31-40 h 41-84 h ∑
0 h 0.12 -1.00 -0.98 -0.93 0.57 -0.27
1-30 h 6.32 0.10 -0.81 0.05 0.60 1.97
31-40 h -0.25 0.33 -0.91 -0.77 4.05 -0.28
41-50 h 1.71 2.82 -0.96 -0.89 0.04 0.66
51-84 h -0.82 -0.95 -1.00 -0.98 2.11 -0.55
∑ 0.42 0.75 -0.94 -0.80 1.70 0.00
∑(part-time) -0.37
Note: The cells with italicized numbers indicate the relative deviations (see text) of the four most
frequent labor supply regimes.
Table 3 presents the relative deviation between the actual and the predicted distri-
bution of household labor supply. The measure of relative deviation is defined as
rd r r
r
rr =
−
=
(estimated no. of choices = actual no. of choices =
actual no. of choices =
) ( ) ; ,...,1 25
where r  stands for the alternative labor supply regimes. The relative deviations
between the sum of the rows and columns in Table 2 (e.g. the sum of all non-
working women) and the estimated distribution of labor supply are calculated in the
same way. As can be seen, the resulting values vary between minus one and 6.3.
Zero implies perfect prediction, whereas minus one indicates strong underprediction
and high positive values imply substantial overprediction.
Non-participation and jobs up to 15 hours (geringfügige Beschäftigung) of women,
as well as the part-time share of men, are highly overpredicted. This result is in line
with the findings of van Soest (1995). On the other hand, women working between
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16 and 30 hours a week are strongly underpredicted (-0.94). Also striking is the
overprediction of women working overtime. The regime where the man works
between 41 and 50 hours and the women does not work is the worst predicted cell
of the four most frequent labor supply choices (italicized numbers). Overall, the fit
of the model is not satisfactory.
4.2.2 Labor supply model with endogenous wages
In the next step, we predict the household labor supply taking into account that
wages also depend on hours worked (see section 4.1).11 Even if the estimated
coefficients differ considerably from those in the previous model, it still holds that
the utility function is quasiconcave with respect to net income (see Model 2 in
Table A2 in the Appendix). Also the predicted labor supply distribution changes
significantly compared to the standard neoclassical model (see Table 4).
Table 4: Relative deviations from the actual distribution based on the model with 
endogenous wages
female labor supply (in weekly hours)
male 0 h 1-15 h 16-30 h 31-40 h 41-84 h ∑
0 h 0.86 -1.00 -1.00 -0.79 0.00 0.17
1-30 h 0.88 -1.00 -1.00 0.40 -1.00 -0.01
31-40 h -0.28 -0.99 -0.92 0.03 0.00 -0.39
41-50 h 2.73 -0.79 -0.98 0.51 -0.90 0.92
51-84 h -0.97 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 0.46 -0.82
∑ 0.67 -0.94 -0.96 -0.06 -0.28 0.00
∑(part-time) -0.95
Note: see Table 3.
The most striking thing about this outcome is the overprediction of non-working
women (0.67). On the other hand, the underprediction of part-time jobs for women
is severe (-0.94 for jobs between 1 and 15 hours and -0.96 for other part-time jobs).
Due to the negative wage differentials of female part-time jobs it seems reasonable
that women partly prefer not to work if they cannot find or accept a full-time job.
The share of the two groups of full-time jobs is predicted quite well. This does not
hold for men. Whereas the underprediction of jobs with more than 50 hours can be
                                          
11
 Starting from the observed wage rate w l w lm
a
f
a( ), ( ) , we compute the wage rates of the three
other labor supply categories of men and women w l w lm
r
f
r( ), ( )  based on the estimated wage
differentials between full-time and part-time jobs. If no wage rate is observed, we use the
predicted wage rates from Table A2 in the Appendix.
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explained by the negative wage differentials of these jobs, the interpretation of the
high estimated share of men working between 41 and 50 hours is somewhat diffi-
cult. These results differ from the findings of van Soest (1995) for the Netherlands.
Estimates from his basic model (more or less equivalent to our standard neoclassical
model) yield an overprediction of part-time jobs up to 10 hours and also for jobs
with more than 45 hours a week. The altering results probably reflect the
assumption that wages do not depend on labor supply.
The crucial question is thus: why do women tend to choose part-time jobs even if
they have to accept substantial wage reductions? Probably these jobs have non-
pecuniary characteristics which compensate the employees for the wage differential
(see for example, Ermisch/Wright, 1993). One of these characteristics may be that a
part-time job is the only feasible employment for mothers, because it allows them to
reconcile working with child caring. Further, accepting a part-time job can prevent a
longer employment break after the birth of a child, which may also cause significant
wage reductions compared with the wage rate before the employment break. Thus,
the bad fit of the previous labor supply models cannot necessarily be blamed on
hours restrictions in the German labor market. There are grounds for supposing that
restrictions inside the household are also responsible for the underprediction of
part-time work.
4.2.3 Labor supply model with endogenous wages and hours restrictions
Since the heterogeneity of the preferences cannot be captured in a sufficient way by
our simple specification (see equations (2) and (3)), we add further direct informa-
tion on working time preferences to the utility function. The utility function is now
defined as
(1’) U U(v) h h h= + ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅ −δ δ δ1 2 31 30 1 15 16 30c mc c fc c fcpt pt pt( ) ( ) ( ),
where c d u= ,  indicates whether the part-time job is desired or undesired. Thus,
unlike van Soest (1995), we do not assume that all part-time jobs generate the same
disutility. Because part-time jobs are scarce (relative to full-time jobs), we expect
that part-time work generates additional utility to the household where it is desired.
On the other hand, undesired part-time work is assumed to decrease family utility.
The information about desired hours allows us to distinguish between desired and
undesired part-time work. Thus, we create six dummy variables for the desired and
undesired part-time jobs of men and women (see Table 5). Almost every second
man working part-time or woman working less than 16 hours a week is not satisfied
with his or her working time, meaning that they are restricted. But only 20 percent
of women are dissatisfied with their actual part-time job.
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Table 5: Share of desired and undesired part-time jobs
women (1-15 hours) women (16-30 hours) men (1-30 hours)
absolute in % absolute in % absolute in %
desired 112 53.1 335 80.5 40 51.9
undesired 99 46.9 81 19.5 37 48.1
total 211 100.0 416 100.0 77 100.0
The estimation results for the modified utility function are presented in Table A3 in
the Appendix (Model 3). In general, the estimated coefficients support our hypothe-
sis. As long as women can realize their preferences for part-time work, family utility
increases. However, there is no significant impact of desired male part-time em-
ployment on family utility. As soon as the part-time job of women or men does not
correspond with the individual preferences, the household utility level decreases. 12
Finally, we want to check if the predictions based on this labor supply model fit the
data better than the previous models. Table 6 shows almost no underprediction of
female part-time work. The sole exception are jobs of up to 15 hours (-0.14). At the
same time, the labor supply of the men decreases, that is, time is reallocated within
the household.13 A plausible explanation for the overprediction of the overtime jobs
of men in the previous models is due to the fact that the share of non-working
women was also seriously overpredicted. Because there are no significant negative
wage differentials for men working between 41 and 50 hours a week, they increase
their labor supply in order to compensate for the reduction in household income
associated with the low earnings of their spouses in part-time employment. If we
now allow for the specific effects of desired and undesired part-time jobs, the pecu-
niary incentives which reduce part-time work for women become less important.
As with the distribution of the actual labor supply, the most likely choice is the re-
gime where the man works between 31 and 40 hours and the woman is out of work.
Except for the regime where neither the man nor the woman works, the other three
most frequent labor supply choices (cells with italic numbers) are predicted quite
well. Also the pseudo R2 implies a substantial improvement in the fit of the model.
                                          
12
 We also ran a regression without the distinction between desired and undesired part-time work,
but with dummy variables for part-time work by gender. Similar to van Soest (1995), all such
coefficients were negative (see Model 4 in the Appendix).
13
 Compared with the model without hours restrictions (Table 4), the relative deviation from the
actual hours distribution for men working between 41 and 50 hours falls from 0.92 to -0.11.
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Table 6: Relative deviations from the actual distribution based on the model with 
endogenous wages and hours restrictions
female labor supply (in weekly hours)
male 0 h 1-15 h 16-30 h 31-40 h 41-84 h ∑
0 h 0.74 0.25 -0.61 -0.56 -0.86 0.22
1-30 h -0.80 -0.70 -0.94 -0.55 -1.00 -0.76
31-40 h 0.23 0.03 1.19 -0.13 -1.00 0.25
41-50 h 0.30 -0.16 0.09 -0.72 -1.00 -0.11
51-84 h -0.90 -1.00 -0.96 -0.98 -0.68 -0.91
∑ 0.23 -0.14 0.35 -0.41 -0.92 0.00
∑(part-time) 0.18
Note: see Table 3.
4.3 Elasticities
The previous results indicate the fact that hours restrictions do influence the labor
supply decision of West German couples. Accordingly the wage elasticities of the
standard neoclassical model and the extended labor supply model will also differ.
Table 7 gives computations of the average uncompensated elasticities due to a
increase in the gross wage rate of men or women. The advantage of the family labor
supply model is that we can not only calculate own wage elasticities but also cross
elasticities. The wage rate itself is not an element of the utility function, so that it is
pretty complicated to calculate the elasticities from the estimated parameters. The
results are thus derived from several simulations.
Table 7: Uncompensated gross wage elasticities
male wage rate + 10% female wage rate + 10%
male elasticity female elasticity male elasticity female elasticity
Model 1 0.53 -0.07 0.12 0.77
Model 3 0.29 -0.17 0.02 0.42
Elasticities based on Model 3
1 - 15 hours 0.05 0.18
16 - 30 hours 0.19 -0.14 0.03 0.32
31 - 40 hours 0.24 -0.18 -0.06 0.43
41 - 50 hours 0.19 -0.16 -0.04 0.19
> 50 hours 0.17 -0.18
Note: Cross elasticities are marked with italic numbers.
Comparing the basic model with the one that also accounts for endogenous wages
and hours restrictions, we can see that the elasticities are much smaller in the
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extended model. This outcome is in line with the results of van Soest (1995). The
elasticity of men is 0.53 in the standard neoclassical model and falls to 0.29 in
Model 3. Compared with previous results in the literature this is a relatively high
estimate. Female elasticities are higher, but also decrease from 0.77 to 0.42 once we
allow for endogenous wages and hours restrictions. The cross elasticity of women is
negative, that is, women reduce their labor supply if the male wage rate increases. In
contrast, men almost do not react to changes in the woman’s wage rate if we allow
for endogenous wages and hours restrictions. This also confirms our previous
finding that male and female leisure are not perfect substitutes.
If we analyze the elasticities for the different groups of employees, it emerges that
the relatively high elasticity of men is determined by the reaction of non-working
people. Employed men increase their labor supply only by about 2 percent if their
gross wage rate increases by 10 percent. Those who already work more than 50
hours a week tend to react less to a wage rise. Also interesting is the low wage elas-
ticity (0.18) of women working less than 15 hours. This behavior is probably due to
the social security system or the non-availability if adequate part-time jobs.
Table 8: Adjustment of the participation rate
male wage rate + 10% female wage rate + 10%
pr(m)t0 pr(m)t1 pr(f)t0 pr(f)t1 pr(m)t0 pr(m)t1 pr(f)t0 pr(f)t1
Model 1 80.1 84.6 27.4 25.3 80.1 81.2 27.4 33.7
Model 4 79.3 82.4 46.4 45.0 79.3 79.9 46.4 48.2
Note: pr(m)t0 [pr(m)t0] indicates the estimated participation rate of men [women] in the present
situation and pr(m)t1 [pr(m)t1] is the corresponding simulated participation rate after the increase of
the gross wage rate. Adjustments due to changes in the partner’s wage are marked with italic
letters.
A further indicator of labor supply adjustment due to an exogenous shock is the
participation rate (see Table 8). In line with the elasticities, the change of the par-
ticipation rate is much lower in model 4. If we account for endogenous wages and
hours restrictions, the simulated labor force participation of men increases by about
3 percentage points while women reduce their participation by 1.6 percentage
points, given a 10% rise in male wages. In contrast to the elasticities, however,
women adjust their participation less to their own wage rise than do men. The
simulated female participation rate increases only about 1.6 percentage points. The
cross adjustment of men can be neglected.
5 Conclusion
In order to detect hours restrictions on the West German labor market we presented
a labor supply model of married and cohabiting couples. Following van Soest
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(1995), the labor supply decision is derived from a household utility function which
is determined by the leisure of the two partners and the household income. The
choice set of each couple contains 25 labor supply regimes, defined by the labor
supply of the two spouses and the corresponding household budget. Using this dis-
crete labor supply approach allows us to incorporate the main features of the
German tax and benefit system in a straightforward way. We have estimated two
extensions of the basic model, one allowing for endogenous wages and the other
also taking into account hours restrictions.
We conclude that the model with endogenous wages and hours restrictions fits the
data much better than the two alternative model specifications. As expected, the
estimation of the utility function implies that part-time jobs of women increase
family utility provided that they are desired. This outcome differs from the findings
of van Soest (1995), where all part-time jobs reduce the family utility. Looking at
the uncompensated average wage elasticities, we show that the model which allows
for endogenous wages and hours restrictions predicts smaller reaction of the labor
market participants than does the neoclassical model. The same holds for the
simulated participation rates. Thus, we conclude that the consideration of hours
restrictions not only improves the explanation of labor supply decisions but also has
an impact on the derived wage elasticities. In short, hours restrictions do matter.
Even if we already dropped some of the restrictive assumptions of standard labor
supply models, there remain several problems, which should be tackled in further
research. Firstly, when estimating the extended wage function (see equation 6), the
potential endogeneity of working hours should be taken into account. In principle,
the wage equation and the utility function can be estimated simultaneously. An
alternative is to use an instrumental variable estimation of the wage equation (e.g.
Ilmakunnas/Pudney, 1990). A third approach would be to estimate the wage differ-
ential between full-time and part-time jobs by running separate regressions for both
types of employment, and then decomposing the difference in expected hourly wage
rates into two components. One component would reflect the differences in attrib-
utes between part-time and full-time employees, and the other would capture the
differences in rewards to individual characteristics. Since the employment status is
not random, the endogeneity of the selection process should also be accommodated
(Main, 1988).
The second point concerns the implementation of the hours restrictions, which is ad
hoc. Provided that hours restrictions are modeled in a structural way, we can learn
how people adapt their labor supply if these constraints were relaxed in a specific
way. This extension would be extremely interesting for policy purposes. Relatedly,
more emphasis should be placed on the simulation of the German tax and benefit
system.
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Appendix
Table A1:  Estimation of the tax function
married couples cohabiting partners
men women
log(net income) coef t-value coef t-value coef t-value
constant 66.17 0.3 766.2* 5.3 470.4* 5.0
log(gross income) 0.77* 10.6 0.47* 9.6 0.50* 16.0
log(gross income)2/1000 0.01* -2.1 0.05 1.3 0.07* 4.0
social security premiums -298.90* -6.7 -230.0* -2.4 -162.2* -2.0
children 115.14* 8.8 – – 179.5* 5.3
transfer to divorced partner 837.20 0.8 679.0* 3.8 – –
transfer to children 83.27 1.4 53.7 0.7 522.0* 2.1
no. of  observations 1385 208 199
F-test (gross income) F(2,1378) = 2023.7 F(2,202) = 403.9 F(2,193) = 2595.1
adjusted R2 0.89 0.91 0.93
Note: The tax function is estimated by OLS, where the standard errors are corrected for
heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). The dependent variable is defined as the log of the household net
income for married couples and the individual net income respectively. * denotes significance at
the 0.05 level.
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Table A2: Estimation results of the wage functions
men women men women
log(wage rate) coef t-value coef t-value coef t-value coef t-value
constant 2.78* 62.4 2.61* 48.3 2.77* 62.9 2.64* 49.0
hours 1 – – – – -0.01 -0.2 -0.31* -6.2
hours 2 – – – – 0.02 1.5 -0.06* -2.6
hours 4 – – – – -0.17* -5.3 -0.20* -4.7
exp 0.03* 8.7 0.03* 6.4 0.03* 9.1 0.03* 6.9
exp2/100 0.05* -7.1 -0.06* -5.7 -0.06* -7.5 -0.07* -6.4
unskilled -0.15* -5.4 -0.15* -4.5 -0.15* -5.8 -0.14* -4.4
master craftsman 0.07* 3.6 0.06* 2.1 0.06* 3.5 0.06* 2.0
graduate 0.39* 17.7 0.45* 10.3 0.40* 17.6 0.46* 10.6
handicapped   0.04 -0.6 -0.21* 2.4  -0.06 -0.9 0.18* 2.3
no. of children – – -0.05* -4.1 – – -0.03* -2.7
no. of  obs. 1649 1110 1649 1110
F-test (region) 1.95 1.48 1.69 1.46
R2 0.25 0.18 0.27 0.24
Note: The wage equation is estimated by OLS, where the standard errors are corrected for
heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). The dependent variable is defined as the log of the hourly gross
wage rate. The base category for the qualification level are the skilled employees. a hours 1: 1-30 h
[1-15 h] for men [women]. b hours 2: 31-40 h [16-30 h] for men [women]. c hours 4: > 50 h [> 40
h] for men [women]. The coefficients of the regional dummies are not reported in the table. *
denotes significance at the 0.05 level.
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Table A3: Maximum likelihood estimates of the utility function
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
variables coef t-value coef t-value coef t-value coef t-value
net income -112.01* -15.7 -66.31* -10.2 -71.56* -11.3 -68.60* -10.9
net income2 3.1* 16.2 2.64* 12.7 2.32* 11.6 2.24* 11.2
net income · lm 8.13* 15.8 3.73* 8.0 5.04* 10.9 4.84* 10.5
net income · lf 5.08* 10.5 2.67* 5.8 3.42* 7.5 3.27* 7.2
lm 115.95* 6.2 159.77* 8.7 143.33* 8.1 147.23* 8.3
l2m 1.46* 3.5 0.26 0.6 0.45 1.2 0.38 1.0
lm × age -125.77* -13.4 -114.77* -12.3 -116.71* -13.0 -117.38* -13.1
l2m × age 17.49* 13.8 16.04* 12.7 16.21* 13.3 16.30* 13.4
lf 80.92* 3.6 93.80* 4.3 116.91* 5.6 129.53* 6.1
l2f 2.32* 4.1 3.57* 6.6 -0.74 -1.1 -0.77 -1.1
lf × age -100.68* -8.5 -92.84* -7.9 -92.47* -8.3 -98.88* -8.8
lf·× age2 14.64* 8.9 13.55* 8.3 13.38* 8.7 14.34* 9.2
lf·× k3 6.92* 9.3 6.68* 9.3 5.79* 9.4 5.50* 9.2
lf·× k16 2.42* 13.9 2.41* 13.9 2.31 13.7 2.31* 14.0
lf × lm 7.48* 12.8 3.36* 6.1 5.25* 9.4 5.13* 9.2
part-timem – – -1.96* -16.0
part-timef
(1-15 hours)
– – -1.30* -15.9
part-timef
(16-30 hours )
– – -0.30* -3.7
desired ptm -0.03 -0.1 – –
undesired ptm -2.60* -15.3 – –
desired ptf 
(1-15 hours)
1.21* 7.8 – –
undesired ptf
(1-15 hours)
-2.01* -18.3 – –
desired ptf 
(16-30 hours)
0.69* 7.5 – –
undesired ptf
(16-30 hours)
-1.57* -12.2 – –
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.16 0.26 0.20
χ2 χ2(15)= 2188.8 χ2(15)= 2273.5 χ2(21)= 3783.7 χ2(18)= 2991.1
log likelihood -6242 -6199 -5444 -5840
Note: The reference group for the part-time dummies are all households, where neither the man
nor the woman works part-time. * denotes significance at the 0.05 level. The χ2 -test refers to all
explanatory variables of the model. The pseudo R2 is defined as 1 1 0− L L/ , where L1 is the log-
likelihood value of the model with all exogenous variables and L0 is the log-likelihood value of the
model which includes only a constant term.
